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Abstract. This paper develops a duopoly model to analyse capacity sharing strategy and the 
optimal revenue-sharing contract under a two-part tariff and examines the effects of capacity 
sharing, cost, and sharing charges in three scenarios. The paper uses the two-part tariff method 
and adds a more realistic assumption of incremental marginal costs to improve the research 
on capacity sharing strategies. The results show that capacity constraints affect the sustainable 
development of firms. A sustainable revenue-sharing contract can create a win-win situation for 
both firms and promote capacity sharing. Capacity sharing, cost, and the revenue-sharing rate 
have different impacts in different scenarios; the optimal revenue-sharing rate and fixed fee can 
be determined to maximise the profits of firms that share capacity. However, capacity sharing 
may not improve social welfare.
Keywords: duopoly, capacity sharing strategy, sustainable revenue-sharing contracts, two-part 
tariff, win-win development.
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Introduction 
The productive capacity is related to the sustainable development and competitiveness of 
an enterprise (González-Blanco et al., 2019). A mismatch between supply and demand is a 
common problem in many markets. Excessive or insufficient productive capacity in off-peak 
and peak seasons is a major barrier to sustainable development. This problem is particularly 
prominent in traditional manufacturing, manifesting in issues such as labour shortages and 
insufficient production capacity in peak seasons, surplus labour in off-seasons, and idle pro-
duction machinery. One way to solve the problem is to share capacity among firms, which is 
conducive to revitalising idle resources and realising the sharing of production factors from 
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the perspective of sustainable development concepts. The capacity sharing strategy is applied 
in the manufacturing and aviation fields (Sun et al., 2020; Zhao & Han, 2020; Xie & Han, 
2020; Silva et al., 2019). For example, some firms that provide air transportation services 
have the dual characteristics of product homogeneity and low marginal costs. To address a 
mismatch between supply and demand before flight departure, competing airlines may share 
their aircraft seats. The capacity sharing has been seriously discussed in the literature, as 
evidenced by extensive research conducted from both theoretical and empirical perspectives 
(Dussauge et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2010).
The paper mainly solves the problem of insufficient capacity or overcapacity faced by 
traditional manufacturing firms It addresses the mismatch between production capacity 
supply and demand in both off-peak and peak seasons. Furthermore, it proposes solutions 
for formulating sustainable revenue-sharing contracts for two firms with different levels of 
production capacity. A sustainable revenue-sharing contract can create a win-win situation 
for both firms and allow the contract to continue. If a firm’s interests are damaged, the con-
tract is unsustainable. In sustainable revenue-sharing contracts, the profits obtained by both 
firms after entering the contract will be higher than before. To solve the problem of resource 
mismatch between insufficient capacity and overcapacity in the manufacturing industry, this 
study designed revenue-sharing contracts. For example, owing to short-term overcapacity, 
the automaker Renault shared production capacity with Nissan, thereby achieving a win-win 
situation. In China, many small firms faced with short-term difficulties have not realised 
sharing capacity for various reasons, such as underdeveloped sharing strategies. To solve sim-
ilar problems, most existing models consider simple fixed-charge capacity sharing contracts. 
However, the model in this study uses the two-part tariff method. In addition, it adds a more 
realistic assumption of incremental marginal cost to increase the authenticity and availability 
of the capacity sharing strategy. In practice, it is conducive to the sustainable development 
of firms in volatile markets.
Driven by these real cases and problems, this study examines sustainable revenue-sharing 
contracts for capacity sharing among competitors under capacity constraints. We mainly 
focus on the following issues:
(1) Under capacity constraints, should two firms choose a capacity sharing strategy?
(2) If firms adopt a capacity sharing strategy, how should they establish a sustainable 
revenue-sharing contract, that is, the sharing of charges?
(3) How does the revenue-sharing contract influence the firms’ profits, consumer surplus, 
and social welfare?
1. Literature review
Numerous studies on capacity sharing have been conducted which provide useful references 
for this study. 
First, there is a large amount of relevant literature on the role of capacity sharing. Nunes 
et al. (2014) discussed the need for capacity sharing in User-Centric Networks. Moghaddam 
and Nof (2014) combined demand and capacity sharing with the best matching decisions 
used during enterprise collaboration. Yu et al. (2015) studied the benefits of sharing produc-
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tion capacity for a group of independent companies. Li and Zhang (2015) studied capacity 
sharing, which can be realised under various market conditions, between pairs of freight 
forwarders in the shipping market, and find that it can benefit both operators and agents. 
Roels and Tang (2016) discussed a strategic alliance in which a company shared its manu-
facturing capabilities with another company. Padilla Tinoco et al. (2017) studied the benefits 
of collaborative shipping, whereby two shippers bundled their shipments to share the same 
vehicle. Feng et  al. (2017) discussed capacity sharing for an integrated secondary supply 
chain and then developed an effective algorithm to find the optimal solution. Qi et al. (2019) 
combined sourcing from a shared supplier and capacity reservation and analysed the effects. 
Melo et al. (2019) concluded that municipalities can take advantage of a sharing economy 
context. Gorelick et al. (2019) explored treatment and capacity sharing agreements between 
water utilities. Fang and Wang (2020) investigated competition strategies adopted under two 
widely used capacity sharing contracting mechanisms. Wei and Zhang (2021) analysed the 
relationship between capacity sharing and postponement flexibility. Chen et al. (2021c) re-
vealed the technology sharing and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market.
Second, there are many related studies on the formulation of capacity sharing contracts. 
For example, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) analysed supply chain coordination of revenue-
sharing contracts. Wu and Chang (2007) presented a capacity trading method that have 
established a capacity-sharing partnership. Seok and Nof (2014) developed a collaborative 
demand and capacity sharing protocol that addressed long-term profitability for each man-
ufacturer through distributed decision making. Yang et al. (2017) designed different sharing 
contracts and concluded that such contracts are best applied under different scenarios. They 
also analysed how to choose capacity decision strategies for each type of capacity sharing 
contract. Guo and Wu (2018) discussed horizontal capacity sharing strategies under compe-
tition. They studied the market equilibrium and optimal enterprise strategy of production 
capacity sharing between two competing firms in a horizontally differentiated market. Zhao 
et al. (2019) examined channel selection and pricing decisions considering three modes of 
production capacity sharing platforms. Zhao et al. (2020) compared the effectiveness of the 
fixed and quality-based transaction fee strategies stipulated by a manufacturing capacity 
sharing platform in a capacity sharing supply chain. They also proposed a quality target 
contract and introduced a two-part tariff contract. Shao (2020) investigated the timing of 
capacity sharing agreements and contracts between two firms. Qin et al. (2020) chose the 
horizontal capacity-sharing strategy with a revenue-sharing contract. Liu et al. (2021) studied 
unmanned vehicle distribution capacity sharing with demand surge under option contracts.
Third, the oligopoly game model has been widely adopted in many decision-making 
research fields, including capacity selection (Ignatius et al., 2018; Nie et al., 2018). Tomaru 
et  al. (2011) analysed capacity selection considering management delegation. Ben Elhadj 
et  al. (2012) characterized the subgame perfect equilibrium for the homogenous market 
case. Nakamura (2014) examined capacity selection between a consumer-friendly firm and 
a standard absolute profit maximisation firm. Tao et al. (2018) studied the applicability of 
the duopoly model. Ueda (2019) investigated the effect of information asymmetry on a dy-
namic Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality. Chen et al. (2021b) considered cor-
porate social responsibility under capacity sharing and analysed equilibrium results. Chen 
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et al. (2020a) analysed capacity sharing decisions made under different oligopoly competi-
tion types and government supervision. Chen et al. (2020b) studied capacity sharing under 
Cournot competition. Choi and Lee (2020) analysed capacity choices adopted in upstream 
and downstream markets. Chen et  al. (2019) established a capacity decision model with 
corporate social responsibility and product differentiation, derives the market equilibrium 
outcomes under Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Chen et al. (2021a) construct a duopo-
ly model and analyze the optimal level of corporate social responsibility. 
Our work contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we comprehensively evaluate 
the impact of capacity sharing on stakeholders, such as consumers, firms, and society. We 
analyse the multiple effects of capacity sharing and then explore the boundaries of its imple-
mentation. Many previous studies have assumed that the cost is zero or constant to simplify 
the analysis (Xie & Han, 2020; Zhao & Han, 2020; Qi et al., 2019). However, in this study, we 
introduce incremental marginal costs to the analysis of capacity sharing. Second, we study 
changes in profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare that result from entering a revenue-
sharing contract. In this analysis, we find that capacity sharing enables both firms to obtain 
higher profits, but this is not necessarily beneficial to social welfare. If the approach benefits 
social welfare, the revenue-sharing rate needs to be controlled within a smaller range. Third, 
in the existing literature, few studies have applied a two-part tariff to capacity sharing charg-
es. We apply the two-part tariff method and analyse the range of fixed fees and the optimal 
revenue-sharing rate, thus enriching the research on capacity sharing charges.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates our model con-
struction, including one with no capacity limitation or capacity sharing, one with capacity 
limitation but no capacity sharing, and one with capacity limitation and capacity sharing. 
Sections 3 to 5 present the equilibrium outputs, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare 
of the three different models. In addition, we analyse the impact of cost and the revenue-
sharing rate for profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Section 6 compares prices, prof-
it, consumer surplus, and social welfare across different situations and analyses them. Finally, 
the conclusions are presented.
2. Model setup
We consider a market with two competing firms (Firm 1 and Firm 2) that sell a homogeneous 
product (or service) under Cournot competition. In a duopoly market, the two firms have the 
same demand because the products are homogeneous. We let q1 and q2 be the sales of Firm 
1 and Firm 2, respectively. Thus, the inverse demand function is written as 1 2p a q q= − − , 
where a is a constant that does not consider the effect of demand.
We assume that Firm 1’s capacity is constrained to k1 and Firm 2’s capacity to k2. Based 
on the assumption of increasing marginal cost (Chen & Nie, 2014; Dong & Barcena-Ruiz, 





c d= >  and 





c d= > , where d is the variable that affects the cost and is hence 
called the cost factor. We analyse equilibrium decisions, profits, consumer surplus, and social 
welfare under the three scenarios. The respective profits can be expressed as i i ipq cπ = − . 
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Consumer surplus can be expressed as ( ) ( )
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Social welfare can be expressed as 1 2sw cs= π + π + .
First, we discuss the scenario of firms without limited capacity constraints and a revenue-
sharing contract as a benchmark model (Model NN). Second, we analyse the scenario of 
firms with limited capacity constraints without a revenue-sharing contract (Model CN). 
Third, we further investigate the scenario of firms with limited capacity under a revenue-
sharing contract (Model CS). We assume that if the profit remains unchanged after sharing, 
Firm 1 will still accept sharing. Firm 2 designates and proposes a revenue-sharing contract, 
and Firm 1 considers whether to accept it.
For the capacity sharing scenario, we consider voluntary capacity sharing between com-
peting firms with a revenue-sharing contract. The sequences of the movements made under 
the contracting schemes are detailed as follows: First, before engaging in market competition, 
the firms agree and commit to a two-part tariff scheme, including fixed fee F and revenue-
sharing rate d. Second, firms set their production and fulfill their respective demands using 
their capacity and shared capacity. A revenue-sharing contract is exercised at committed 
sharing charges. The notation used in the models is listed in Table 1.
Table 1. The notation used in the models
 i Index for Firm i, i = 1, 2
 qi Deterministic production for Firm i
 q Production shared by Firm 1 to Firm 2
 p Price in the market
 ki The capacity quantity owed by Firm i
 ci The total cost of Firm i 
 d revenue-sharing rate
 F Fixed fee in the revenue-sharing contract
 NN No capacity constraint and no capacity sharing
 CN Capacity constraint and No capacity sharing
 CS Capacity constraint and capacity sharing
 CSA Capacity constraint and capacity Sharing, Firm 2 has Adequate capacity
 CSI Capacity constraint and capacity Sharing, Firm 2 has Inadequate capacity
3. Benchmark model
First, we study the benchmark case with no capacity constraints and no capacity sharing for 





1 1 2 1 2
NN dqa q q qπ = − − − , ( )
2
2
2 1 2 2 2
NN dqa q q qπ = − − − . (1)
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Both firms make their production decisions at the same time. We solve the Cournot 
model and obtain the equilibrium production, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare 
from Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For the unlimited capacity model, the equilibrium productions, profits, con-





































































To determine the influence of cost on the decisions and profits of both participants, con-
sumer surplus, and social welfare, we obtain Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: The effects of cost factors on the profits of the participants, consumer surplus, 
and social welfare are as follows:





























Proof: see Appendix A.
Evidently, as the cost increases, the profits of both firms, consumer surplus, and social 
welfare decrease in the unlimited capacity model, which has a practical guiding significance 
for the two firms. d is the cost; therefore, Corollary 1 shows that reducing costs is conducive 
to increasing the profits of the two firms while improving consumer surplus and social wel-
fare. Consequently, in this case, each firm should strive to reduce costs regardless of whether 
it has insufficient capacity or excess capacity; thus, consumer surplus and social welfare can 
be improved. However, in reality, we cannot solve the problem of a mismatch between supply 
and demand by reducing costs to obtain greater profits.
4. No capacity sharing with constrained capacity
In this scenario, Firm 1’s capacity is constrained to k1 and Firm 2’s to k2. Both firms use their 
capacity to meet the market demand. Additionally, the firms make production decisions at 
the same time. Therefore, we can obtain the firms’ profit functions to describe the scenario 





1 1 2 1max 2
CN dqa q q qπ = − − − , ( )
2
2
2 1 2 2max 2
CN dqa q q qπ = − − −   (2)
                 
*
1 1. .  NNs t k q< , *2 2NNk q≥
In Model CN, information on production costs and capacity constraints is complete for 
both firms. We obtain equilibrium production, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare 
by solving the no-sharing Cournot model.
In this section, we focus on the case of *1 1 NNk q<  and *2 2NNk q≥ , which indicates that 
Firm 1 does not have an adequate capacity to meet the desired demand generated in the 
benchmark model. Thus, we can obtain the profit functions under Model CN.





1 1 2 1 2
CN dka k q kπ = − − − , ( )
2
2
2 1 2 2  2
CN dqa k q qπ = − − − . (3)
The equilibrium productions, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare are given by 
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 When *1 1 NNk q<  and *2 2NNk q≥ , the equilibrium solutions in the constrained 
no-sharing model are as follows:
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Based on Lemma 2, we can easily obtain the influence of cost factor on solutions, profits, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare from Corollary 2.
Corollary 2: When *1 1 NNk q<  and *2 2NNk q≥ , the effects of the cost factor on solutions, 
























































Proof: see Appendix B.
Corollary 2 indicates a situation in which one firm has constrained capacity, while the 
other has sufficient capacity. As the cost increases, Firm 2’s profit, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare decrease. However, as the cost increases, Firm 1’s profit first decreases and 
then increases. Thus, when the cost is low, the cost increase does not harm Firm 1’s prof-
its. However, Firm 2’s profit decreases at a higher cost. When Firm 1 is constrained by its 
capacity, it may not expect a cost reduction, and Firm 2 expects this to increase its profits. 
The reasoning here is that the increase in cost will reduce Firm 2’s output, which leads to a 
higher market price, while Firm 1 is less directly affected by the increase in cost and thus 
obtains higher profits. 
This capacity constraint model shows that insufficient capacity will affect profits. In ad-
dition, although the firm with sufficient capacity will not be affected, the mismatch between 
supply and demand will affect social welfare and consumer surplus. To improve sustainable 
development, it is necessary to solve this problem and propose a win-win strategy.
5. Revenue-sharing contracts with constrained capacity
Considering the condition in which *1 1 NNk q<  and *2 2NNk q≥ , when Firm 1 has constrained 
capacity, yet Firm 2 has overcapacity, there is the opportunity for Firm 2 to share its capacity 
with Firm 1. We analyse the capacity sharing strategy and possible improvements in profits 
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for both firms. When both firms profit from the capacity sharing strategy, they negotiate 
sharing charges for shared capacity.
Under these schemes, the firms contract and commit to sharing charges before engaging 
in market competition. Then, they simultaneously set their respective production and consid-
er the constraints of their capacity and possible shared capacity. The revenue-sharing contract 
is exercised at a committed revenue-sharing rate. Finally, the demand is realised. Both firms 
obtain profits. We use backward induction to solve this problem.
Thus, we can obtain Model CS to characterise the revenue-sharing contract model with 
constrained capacity.




1 1 2 1 2





2 1 2 2 2
CS dqa q q q F qπ = − − − + + d , 1 1q k q= + . (4)
Under the conditions of *1 1 NNk q<  and *2 2NNk q≥ , considering the constraints and shared 
production  q , we have the following cases:
(1) Case 5-1 *2 2NNk q≥  and * *1 2 1 2CS CSq q k k+ < +  (Model CSA).
In this case, Firm 2 has adequate capacity, and the total demand of Firms 1 and 2 can be 
satisfied by their total capacity. Firm 2’s demand is not constrained by its capacity. Therefore, 
Firm 2 uses its capacity to meet its desired market demand. Firm 1’s demand can be fully 
satisfied using its capacity and shared capacity.
(2) Case 5-2 *2 2NNk q≥  and * *1 2 1 2CS CSq q k k+ ≥ +  (Model CSI).
In this case, Firm 2 has adequate capacity, but the total demand of both firms cannot be 
satisfied by their total capacity. Firm 2’s demand is not constrained by its capacity. Therefore, 
Firm 2 can use its capacity to meet its desired market demand. Firm 1’s demand cannot be 
fully satisfied by its capacity and shared capacity.
5.1. Case 5-1 *2 2NNk q≥  and * *+ < +1 2 1 2CS CSq q k k
In this case, Firm 2 has adequate capacity, and the total demand of Firms 1 and 2 can be 
satisfied by their total capacity. Here, we can obtain the equilibrium production, profits, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare from Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In the capacity sharing model of Case 5-1, the equilibrium results are:
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.
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(3) The equilibrium profits of the capacity sharing model are as follows:
( )
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 4 3 2 3 3
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(4) The pricing, consumer surplus, and social welfare are as follows:
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Lemma 3 shows the equilibrium solutions for Case 5-1. Based on Lemma 3, we can 
obtain Corollary 3 to discuss the effects of the cost factors and revenue-sharing rate on the 
equilibrium solutions.
Corollary 3: In the capacity sharing model of Case 5-1 with d > 0, the effects of cost factor 
and revenue-sharing rate on the equilibrium solutions are as follows:
(1) If 
2 3 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1
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d d d
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Proof: see Appendix C.
If the two firms want to enter a revenue-sharing contract, they must ensure that the 
profits after sharing will be greater than before. We compare the production of the capacity 
sharing model in Case 5-1 to the no-capacity sharing model. Then, we obtain Proposition 1: 
It can be seen that the two firms follow their profit maximisation principles when setting the 
revenue-sharing rate. However, social welfare decreases as the revenue-sharing rate increases. 
Therefore, the government can guide firms to reduce the revenue-sharing rate on the premise 
of increasing profits as much as possible to minimise the negative impact on social welfare.
Proposition 1. The range of the revenue-sharing rate is as follows:
If the two firms’ profits after sharing are greater than when sharing is not applied, the 
revenue-sharing rate must satisfy 1 12 1x x< d < , where
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( ) ( )
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Proof: see Appendix D.
Based on the range of revenue-sharing rate, both firms negotiate the sharing charges un-
der the capacity sharing strategy, which means that in the case of limited capacity, partners 
with the revenue-sharing contract for capacity sharing obtain more profits than those without 
it. The two firms’ profits satisfy the following inequality: * *1 1CSA CNπ > π  and * *2 2CSA CNπ > π .
Within the range of this revenue-sharing rate, we further study the optimal charges that 
fit the contract. We assume that this revenue-sharing rate is determined by the firm that 
shares its capacity (Firm 2). Therefore, Firm 2 will set a revenue-sharing rate that maximises 
its profit. From Corollary 3(2), we know that if we take d as a variable, its profit function 
will first increase and then decrease. Then, we can determine the optimal 0CSAd  as follows:
 
2 3 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1
0 3 2
9 5 10 24 6 22 8
2 12 21 10
CSA k a ad dk ad ad d k d k d k
d d d




In addition, we find the range of fixed-fee F. For Firm 2, there is no doubt that the larger 
F is, the more profit Firm 2 will make. Therefore, F has no upper limit. However, for Firm 1, 
if F is too large, it may be impossible for Firm 1 to make a profit regardless of how low the 
revenue-sharing rate is. From the perspective of Firm 1, F has an upper limit. We assume 
the extreme case when the revenue-sharing rate d is 0 (all the profits obtained from shared 
capacity belong to Firm 1). When the revenue-sharing rate is zero, F is maximum. When F 
exceeds this number, Firm 1 cannot make more profit regardless of how the rate of return is 














Of course, FCSA is the largest possible fixed fee. Only with a fixed fee which is lower than 
FCSA, Firm 1 obtains higher profits than before. Firm 2’s profit increases with an increase in 
F. Therefore, the two firms should flexibly set the fixed fee in the contract within this upper 
limit.
5.2. Case 5-2 *2 2NNk q≥ and * *1 2+ ≥ +1 2CS CSq q k k
In this case, Firm 2 has sufficient capacity, but the total demand of both firms cannot be satis-
fied by their capacity. Firm 2’s demand is not constrained by its capacity. Thus, Firm 2 uses 
its capacity to meet its desired market demand. However, Firm 1’s desired demand cannot 
be fully satisfied by its capacity and shared capacity because Firm 2’s capacity is inadequate 
for total demand. That is * *1 2 1 2CS CSq q k k+ ≥ + , where 2 2q k q= −  and 1 1q k q= + .
Thus, we can obtain Model CSI to characterise the model of the revenue-sharing contract 
with constrained capacity, and Firm 2’s capacity is inadequate.





1 1 2 1 2
CSI dqa k k q F qπ = − − − − − d , ( )
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(7)
Lemma 4. In the capacity sharing models of Case 5-2, the equilibrium results are
(1) The equilibrium productions for the capacity sharing model are as follows:
     
1 2*
1
CSI a k kq
d
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= .
(3) The equilibrium profits of the capacity sharing model are as follows:
2 2 2 2
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Lemma 4 shows the equilibrium solutions for Case 5-2. Based on Lemma 4, we can 
obtain Corollary 4 to discuss the effects of cost factors and the revenue-sharing rate on the 
equilibrium solutions.
Corollary 4: In the capacity sharing models of Case 5-2 with d > 0, the effects of cost fac-
tors and the revenue-sharing rate on the equilibrium solutions are as follows:













If 1 2 1
2
a k k dk− − −






; if 1 2 1
2
a k k dk− − −












































Proof: see Appendix E.
If the two firms want to use the revenue-sharing contract, they must ensure that the 
profits generated after sharing are greater than before. We compare the productions of the 
capacity sharing model in Case 5-2 to the no-capacity sharing model. Then, we obtain Prop-
osition 2. The difference from Case 5-1 is that when Firm 2’s capacity is sufficient to share 
with Firm 1 and it can meet al. market demands, consumer surplus is not affected by the 
cost and revenue-sharing rate. The utility of consumers does not change because of changes 
in the revenue-sharing rate. These results have some enlightenment for government-guiding 
firms to reach a win-win sustainable revenue-sharing contract.
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Proposition 2. The range of the revenue-sharing rate is:
If the two firms’ profits are greater with sharing than without, the revenue-sharing rate must 
satisfy 1 12 1 y y< d < , where ( )
2
1 1 2 1 1 21




F dF ak k k k dk k
y a k k dk d
d d
+ − + + +




1 2 1 21
2 2 4 2
a k k dk
y
d




Proof: see Appendix F.
Based on the range of revenue-sharing rate, both firms negotiate the sharing charges 
under the capacity sharing strategy, which means that in the limited capacity case, part-
ners should obtain more profits with the revenue-sharing contract for capacity sharing than 
without the revenue-sharing contract. The two firms’ profits satisfy the following inequality: 
* *
1 1
CSI CNπ > π  and * *2 2CSI CNπ > π . Similar to the analysis of Case 1, we also assume that Firm 




CSI a k k dk− − −d = , 
( ) ( )( )22 1 2 1 11 1
2 2 2
CSI k k a k k a dk dF
d d





Based on the above three models, we can compare the three equilibrium solutions. Through 
these comparisons, we provide a reference for decision makers in the two firms about wheth-
er to share capacity and how to predict market changes. For example, when a firm’s capacity 
is constrained, are consumer surplus and social welfare reduced? When two firms share their 
capacity, how will the price change?
Based on the previous analysis, we identified three situations. We compare the prices, 
profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare in these situations.
Corollary 5: The comparison results are as follows:
(1) * *CN NNp p> . * *CSA NNp p> ,
if 
2
1 1 19 9 2
2
k a ad dk d k
d
− − + +
d < −
+
, then * *CSA CNp p< , 
if 
2
1 1 19 9 2
2
k a ad dk d k
d
− − + +
d > −
+














, then * *CSI NNp p> ,
if 1 1a k dkd < − − , then * *CSI CNp p< , 
if 1 1a k dkd > − − , then * *CSI CNp p> ,
if 21 1 15 2 6k d k d a kd < + + + , then * *CSI CSAp p< , 
if 21 1 15 2 6k d k d a kd > + + + , 
then * *CSI CSAp p> .
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(2) * *1 1CN NNπ < π , * *2 2CN NNπ > π ,
if 1 12 1x x< d < , then * *1 1CSA CNπ > π  and * *2 2CSA CNπ > π ,
if 1 12 1y y< d < , then * *1 1CSI CNπ > π  and * *2 2CSI CNπ > π ,
( ) ( )
( )
2 3 2 2 3 2
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 3
1 4 9 15 4 3 2 12 24 16 7
,
2
d a k k d ad d k Fd Fd Fd F k d k d ad
x
d
 + − − + + + + + + + − − +  =
+
( ) ( )( )
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2 3 2
1 1 1 1 11
2 3
1 5 9 15 5 3 7
2
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d
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1 2 1 21
2 2 4 2
a k k dk
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s1 and s2: see Appendix K.
(3) CN NNcs cs< , CSA NNcs cs< ,
if 
2
1 1 14 3
2
ad dk a d k k
d
− + − −
d <
+
, then CSA CNcs cs> , 
if 
2
1 1 14 3
2
ad dk a d k k
d
− + − −
d >
+














, then CSI NNcs cs< ,
if ( ) 11a d kd < − + , then CSI CNcs cs> , 
if ( ) 11a d kd > − + , then CSI CNcs cs< ,
CSI CSAcs cs> .
(4) CN NNsw sw<  and CSA NNsw sw< ,
if 
( )( )1 11 3
2





, then CSA CNsw sw> , 
if 
( )( )1 11 3
2





























, then CSI CNsw sw< ,
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, then CSI CSAsw sw> , 
if 
( ) ( )( )27
3 2
1 3
3 15 23 9
d ad d ad
d d d
+ − + s +
d >
+ + +
, then CSI CSAsw sw< .
Proof: see Appendix G
The comparison between Model NN and Model CN analyses the impact of capacity con-
straints on firms, consumers, and society. We conclude that when Firm 1 faces capacity 
constraints, its profit decreases, Firm 2’s profit increases, and consumer surplus and social 
welfare decrease.
The comparison between Model NN and Model CS determines whether the negative 
effects of capacity constraints can be completely offset by capacity sharing. We conclude 
that although profits increase after sharing, the negative effects of capacity constraints on 
consumer surplus and social welfare cannot be eliminated.
The comparison between Model CN and Model CS analyses the impact of sharing on 
firms, consumers, and society when there is a capacity constraint. For firms, the profits in-
crease. For consumers, when the revenue-sharing rate is lower than a critical value, sharing 
can increase consumer surplus; when the rate exceeds this critical value, sharing reduces 
consumer surplus. A critical value exists for social welfare as well. When the revenue-sharing 
rate exceeds this critical value, it reduces social welfare.
7. Discussion
This study examines the capacity sharing strategies of two firms under Cournot competition, 
revealing the conditions for realising capacity sharing and the factors that affect sharing be-
haviour. The discussion of the results is as follows:
First, the choice of sharing behaviour is affected by production costs, capacity constraints, 
and sharing charges. If production costs are too high, or firms with constrained capacity can 
produce too few products, firms with sufficient capacity are less likely to choose to share. 
Capacity sharing is seen to be a complex game process affected by many factors which must 
be fully considered when formulating a capacity sharing contract.
Second, under different capacity constraints, charges affect the sharing decisions of firms. 
If the capacity constraint is small, two firms with different capacities can reach a capacity 
sharing contract with a lower sharing charge (including a lower fixed fee and lower revenue-
sharing rate). If a firm’s capacity is very limited, or the costs are high, capacity sharing can 
only be achieved under the condition of increasing fixed fees and revenue-sharing rate. In 
the case of increased sharing costs, firms with constrained capacity within a certain range 
can still obtain higher profits than before. Therefore, if firms want to achieve higher profits, 
they can reduce costs by improving production technology and other methods. Firms that 
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face insufficient capacity for a long time can flexibly adjust their negotiation strategies and 
look for firms with sufficient capacity for long-term and stable cooperation. Firms with suf-
ficient capacity, in addition to producing products that meet market demand, can also obtain 
additional profits by sharing capacity. In addition, the government should create a good en-
vironment for capacity sharing, popularise sharing policies, and enable more firms to adopt 
this means of increasing profits. Further, the government can establish a sharing platform to 
reduce the problem of finding firms for cooperation due to information asymmetry.
Third, when a firm faces capacity constraints, its profits are affected. At this time, the prof-
its of the firm with sufficient capacity will increase. Capacity sharing will increase the profits 
of both firms and increase social welfare when the revenue-sharing rate is low, but it cannot 
completely offset the reduction in social welfare due to capacity constraints. Therefore, even 
if the government cannot solve the capacity constraints, it can improve social welfare by 
guiding firms to set a lower sharing rate.
The above results have a certain guiding significance for capacity sharing and coopera-
tion between firms of different sizes. In reality, a large number of small and medium-sized 
firms are faced with insufficient capacity and can achieve sustainable development through 
capacity sharing with large firms. In addition, the study shows that it is necessary to pay 
attention to stakeholders, especially to protect the rights and interests of consumers. If the 
result of capacity sharing is harmful to the interests of consumers, it will cause consumers 
to have a bad experience and negative impressions of the firm, which will be detrimental 
to the future of the firm’s sustainable development. Finally, the research results are also ap-
plicable to other resource-sharing behaviours between firms, especially a certain extent of 
technological asset sharing, which is conducive to promoting production intensification and 
achieving economies of scale.
Conclusions
This study examines the capacity sharing strategy between two firms under Cournot com-
petition and analyses the optimal revenue-sharing contract. In terms of innovation, we use 
the two-part tariff method and consider the assumption of increasing marginal costs. We 
derive the equilibrium outputs, profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare under different 
scenarios and analyse the impacts of capacity sharing, revenue-sharing rate, and cost. In real-
ity, the contract is sustainable only if both firms are profitable. A sustainable capacity sharing 
strategy is conducive to the realisation of a win-win arrangement.
First, the adoption of capacity sharing requires both firms to be profitable. We designed 
a feasible range for revenue-sharing rate and fixed fees. Within this range, the two firms 
choose to apply a revenue-sharing contract to obtain higher profits. Therefore, to promote 
capacity sharing cooperation between them, a contract that can achieve a win-win outcome 
should be designed.
Second, the cost and revenue-sharing rate have different impacts on firms, consumers, 
and society under different scenarios. When there is no capacity constraint or sharing, as 
costs increase, the profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare of the two firms decrease. 
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When there are capacity constraints but no sharing, as costs increase, the profit of the firm 
with capacity constraints first increases and then decreases. The profit of the firm with over-
capacity increases, and consumer surplus and social welfare increase. When there are capac-
ity constraints and sharing, as costs increase, the profits of the two firms, consumer surplus, 
and social welfare decrease, and as the revenue-sharing rate increases, the profit of the firm 
with capacity constraints first decreases and then increases. The profit of the firm with over-
capacity first increases and then decreases, and consumer surplus and social welfare decrease.
Third, according to the conditions for maximising the profit of the firm that is sharing 
its capacity, the optimal revenue-sharing rate and fixed fee (i.e. the optimal sharing charges 
and revenue-sharing contract), which are affected by the constrained capacity and cost, can 
be determined.
Fourth, capacity sharing impacts firms, consumers, and social welfare, and these impacts 
are further affected by the revenue-sharing rate and cost. For firms, capacity sharing increases 
profits. When the revenue-sharing rate is lower than a critical value, sharing can increase 
consumer surplus, and when this critical value is exceeded, sharing reduces consumer sur-
plus. When another critical value is exceeded, capacity sharing reduces social welfare.
Based on these conclusions, the government should formulate policies conducive to busi-
ness cooperation that achieve sustainable development and establish an efficient platform that 
enables firms to seek cooperation. Firms should adopt various measures and try their best to 
achieve sustainable revenue-sharing contracts. 
In the future, capacity sharing contracts among multiple enterprises should be consid-
ered, along with more types of oligopoly competition (e.g. Stackelberg competition and 
Bertrand competition). In addition, to simplify the study, we assumed that there is was no 
product differentiation; therefore, considering product differentiation will be more practical 
and interesting for future studies.
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If 11xd <  or 21xd > , * *1 1CSA CNπ > π . If 1 21 1x x≤ d ≤ , * *1 1CSA CNπ < π .
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s1 : see Appendix K
If 12xd <  or 22xd > , * *2 2CSA CNπ < π . If 1 22 2x x≤ d ≤ , * *2 2CSA CNπ > π .
If two firms want to satisfy * *1 1CSA CNπ > π , * *2 2CSA CNπ > π .
d must satisfy 11 xd < , 1 22 2x x≤ d ≤ , or 21 xd > , 1 22 2x x≤ d ≤ .
Comparing 11x , 21x , 12x  and 22x , we find that 1 1 2 22 1 2 1 x x x x< < < .
Finally, 1 12 1x x< d < .
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F. Proof of Proposition 2
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Based on Model CSA, we have
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Let the solution of * *1 1 0CSI CNπ − π =  be 11y  and 21y .
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If 11yd <  or 21yd > , * *1 1CSI CNπ > π . If 1 21 1y y≤ d ≤ , * *1 1CSI CNπ < π .
Let the solution of * *2 2 0CSI CNπ − π =  be 12y  and 22y .
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s2: see Appendix K
Technological and Economic Development of Economy. Article in press 23
If 12yd <  or 22yd > , * *2 2CSI CNπ < π . If 1 22 2y y≤ d ≤ , * *2 2CSI CNπ > π .
If two firms want to satisfy * *1 1 CSI CNπ > π , * *2 2CSI CNπ > π . 
d must satisfy 11 yd < , 1 22 2y y≤ d ≤  , or 21yd > , 1 22 2y y≤ d ≤ . 
Comparing 11y , 21y , 12y  and 22y , we find that 1 1 2 22 1 2 1y y y y< < < . 
Finally, 1 12 1y y< d < . 
G. Proof of Corollary 5











aa da k d a ddp p
d d d















CSA a k ad dkp
d
+ + d + +
=
+  
it is obvious that * *.NN CSAp p<
The threshold of d is calculated by solving the following equation: * * 0CSA CNp p− = . 
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* *CSA CNp p> .
In Model CSI, the retail price is * 1 2CSIp a k k= − − . In this model, after sharing, the total 













































* *CSI NNp p> .
The threshold of d  is calculated by solving the following equation: * * 0CSI CNp p− = . We 
then obtain 1 1 0a k dkd = − − > . The function is monotonic, so if 1 1a k dkd < − − , then 
* *CSI CNp p<  , if 1 1a k dkd > − − , then 
* *CSI CNp p> .
The threshold of d  is calculated by solving the following equation: * * 0CSI CSAp p− =  . 
We then obtain 21 1 15 2 6 0k d k d a kd = + + + > . The function is monotonic, so If 
2
1 1 15 2 6k d k d a kd < + + + , then * *CSI CSAp p< , if 21 1 15 2 6k d k d a kd > + + + , * *CSI CSAp p> .
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it is obvious that * * * *1 2 1 2 .CSA CSA NN NNq q q q+ < + 
* * * *
1 2 1 2 .CSA CSA NN NNq q q q+ < +  That is CN NNcs cs< .
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The threshold of d  is calculated by solving the following equation: * * * *1 2 1 2 0CSA CSA CN CNq q q q+ − − = 
* * * *
1 2 1 2 0CSA CSA CN CNq q q q+ − − = . We then obtain 
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CSA CNcs cs< .
In Model CSI, the retail price is * *1 2 1 2CSI CSIq q k k+ = + . In this model, after sharing, the total 
capacity of two firms can be sold. Then we have * *1 2 1 2CSI CSIk k q q+ = +  ( ( ) 1. . 3s t a d k> + , 








The threshold of d is calculated by solving the following equation: * * * *1 2 1 2 0CSI CSI NN NNq q q q+ − − =  . 



















, CSI NNcs cs< .
The threshold of d is calculated by solving the following equation: * * * *1 2 1 2 0CSI CSI CN CNq q q q+ − − =  . 
We then obtain 1 1 0a k dkd = − − > . The function is monotonic, so if 1 1a k dkd < − − , then 
CSI CNcs cs> , if 1 1a k dkd > − − , then CSI CNcs cs< .
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The threshold of d  is calculated by solving the following equation: 0CSA CNsw sw− =  . We then 
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CSI NNsw sw< .
The threshold of d is calculated by solving the following equation: 0CSI CNsw sw− = . We 
















, CSI CNsw sw< .
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The threshold of d is calculated by solving the following equation: 0CSI CSAsw sw− =  . 
We then obtain 
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+ + +
. The function is monotonic,
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, CSI CSAsw sw< .
s3, s4 and s5: see Appendix K.
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